A-theory of Time Section 1 - Ian Dunbar's Philosophy Pages

2.02	A Defence of the A-theory of Time

J M E McTaggart, "The Nature of Existence". The argument to the paradoxical nature of time is reprinted in Gale, "The Philosophy of Time".

These issues will be addressed in another essay: "A-Theory and Special Relativity".

4 A-THEORY: EXPOSITION AND PARADOX

6 A-THEORY: REVISED EXPOSITION

1 INTRODUCTION

It was McTaggart who prepared the way for the dispute between two fundamentally distinct accounts of temporal phenomena. He distinguished between two series which are typically used to describe them:

A-series: past - present - future

B-series: earlier than - simultaneous with - later than

(In fact McTaggart introduces the B-series as consisting of just the two terms: earlier and later. The introduction of the middle term “simultaneous with” completes the analogy with the A-series, and, as McTaggart immediately follows the introduction of the notion of the B-series with a discussion of simultaneity, it can not be seen as being at odds with his intentions.)

The dispute concerns which of these two series is the primary temporal reality. Following Gale, let us call the assertion of the primacy of the A-series, the “A-theory”, and the assertion of the primacy of the “B-theory”. McTaggart developed the following argument.

Premiss 1   A-theory: the A-series is fundamental to the phenomenon of time.

Premiss 2   Attempts to describe the A-series lead to paradox.

Therefore   Time must be unreal.

A straightforward response to this argument is the resort to B-theory: denying the first premiss and describing objective time in paradox-free terms using the B-series. This move is strongly in accord with the way Special Relativity (SR) has forced us to change our ideas about time in the actual world of physics.

In this essay I argue that this move is untenable, not because it possesses any logical flaw, but because it contradicts the raw phenomenology of our experience. The world we experience confronts us with the need to deal with McTaggart’s paradox head on. We can not pretend the world were otherwise, just because this would make life easier for our philosophy. To do so would be like the examination candidate who, when confronted with a difficult question, cannot answer it but instead addresses a simpler question to which he does know the answer. The defence of A-theory is incomplete, because it does not show how A-theory can be reconciled with SR, though I do argue from phenomenology that such a reconciliation must exist.