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Abstract(Click here to go to the full essay.) Frege advocated the view that the senses of expressions constitute an
objective realm to which our discourse can refer (what he called "indirect
reference"). This can be used as the basis of a new answer to the question:
what is the subject matter of pure mathematics? The thesis of this essay
is:
Pure mathematics is characterised as being the systematic study of senses,
and in particular their logical inter-relations, regardless of whether
or not they refer to anything. The train of thought leading to this conclusion
has two main parts:
Sciences like physics and chemistry can be seen as making up the Science of Contingent Reference (SCR). Logicism can be described in the same way as the thesis that pure mathematics is the Science of Necessary Reference (SNR), while intuitionism can perhaps be described as seeing mathematics as being the Science of Alternative Reference (SAR), the alternative realm of reference being that perceived, via construction, by our mathematical intuition. The virtue of the SS thesis is that it explains in a natural way the existence of applied mathematics. If pure mathematics is about some realm of reference distinct from the contingent, physical one, then it is something of a mystery why mathematics is so efficacious in our descriptions of the physical world. By contrast, it is inherent in the notion of sense that senses involve the possibility of reference. While we are doing pure mathematics we ignore this aspect, but if the senses turn out to refer, then our deepened understanding of their logical properties, gained by doing pure mathematics, enhances our ability to understand the phenomena referred to. Pure mathematics builds up a stock of explored senses which are available for subsequent referential discourse. The classic example of this happening was when Riemannian geometry, developed as an abstract possibility, was used by Einstein as the means of describing actual spacetime in General Relativity. The SS thesis is related to the assertion that the axiom sets of pure mathematics are stipulations of the meaning of the otherwise undefined terms within them. This idea was attacked, from their different perspectives, by Frege and Brouwer, who argued, in effect, that mere stipulation can not establish the truth of axioms. With this we can agree. The SS thesis merely says that axioms establish the sense of certain terms within them; stipulation says nothing about reference in general and truth in particular. The SS thesis does not answer many of the great questions concerning pure mathematics, but it does reframe them. This is illustrated by the following examples.
The fruitfulness of the SS thesis will depend to a large extent on the utility of this way of reframing the questions. The SS thesis can be compared with other accounts of mathematics.
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Mathematics presents us with the strange situation
of a huge and well-developed discipline where it is unclear what the whole
thing is about. The fact that mathematics is useful (indeed, indispensible)
in science is often treated as mysterious. If we follow Frege in believing
in a realm of sense, then pure mathematics can be seen as the systematic
study of sense, and applied mathematics as the systematic study of the senses
of statements about the world of (primary) reference. |
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